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Transnational solidarity and cross-border practices in Europe23 
This chapter focuses on the factors that promote the support for European social 
solidarity among European citizens – a key dimension of the sense of belonging to Europe 
as operationalized in the EUCROSS project. Given the context of the recent economic 
crisis, transnational social solidarity is understood as support for Eurobonds and other 
mechanisms that have been presented by national and EU political actors as solutions to 
the economic difficulties some of the EU countries faced during the 2008-2013 period. 
Drawing on theoretical and empirical perspectives on national social solidarity, the 
chapter deduces a set of explanations that can be applicable to understanding solidarity 
EU context.  
While there is extensive research on both theoretical and empirical underpinnings of 
social solidarity in the context of national states, there is a shortage of studies in what 
regards social solidarity in a transnational polity such as the EU (but see Ross and 
Borgmann-Prebil 2010). Normative reflections on the future of the EU warn that there is a 
European crisis of solidarity. This crisis is generated mainly by the ambiguity of the 
concept of European ‘peoplehood’ and feelings of loss of national identity and economic 
insecurity (Borgmann-Prebil and Ross 2010; Delanty 2008). Based on the EUCROSS survey 
data with nationals of the six countries selected, the main findings of this chapter show 
that identification with Europe and transnational friendships are significant predictors of 
European solidarity. With the exception of returnees, when compared to locals, the other 
patterns of cross-border mobility presented in Chapter 1 have no role in explaining the 
endorsement of transnational forms of solidarity.  
National and transnational solidarity 
Social solidarity entails networks of relationships that presuppose dependency, 
reciprocity and responsibility among the members of a group or a political community. 
Regarded either as the essential characteristic of societies by Durkheim (Evans 1977; von 
Oorschot and Komter 1998) or as a special type of social relationship by Weber (Stjerno 
2005), in essence, social solidarity refers to group loyalty and sharing of resources in a 
political community. Historically, national governments are the repository of the 
institutions of solidarity in a society. Their role is to define the networks of mutual 
support and to delimitate the groups among which economic and social hazards are 
distributed (de Deken et al 2006: 142). Consequently, social solidarity has a component of 
‘top-down’ enforcement of obligations and responsibilities and a horizontal dimension 
through which individual members legitimize these rules (Parsons 1967). Without 
individual approval, formal rules of social solidarity face the danger of ‘free-riding’ and 
non-compliance. But what motivates individual members of a political community to 
support relationships of responsibility, interdependence and reciprocity among each 
other? 
In the context of national societies, ‘categorical identities’ such as ‘nation’ or ‘community’ 
sustain social solidarity among the members of a political community (Calhoun 2002). 
However, these categorical identities do not rise in a vacuum. Social interactions and 
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exchanges with other group members are likely to bring awareness of the existence of 
other similar individuals with shared interests and destiny. Following this argumentative 
line, the subsequent analysis explores the extent to which identification with Europe and 
cross-border interactions foster a conception of transnational solidarity among 
individuals.  
Hypotheses 
Shared identity and European solidarity 
National identity posits individuals as ‘equivalent to each other’ and justifies both the 
bottom-up and top-down enforcement of solidarity on the basis of the sharing of a 
common identity/similarity. In this situation, the individual shares a set of cultural 
elements with the other members of the group/political community and this common 
identification and recognition is what constitutes the basis for solidarity among members. 
It is no surprise that following this line of reasoning the connection between identity and 
solidarity has been mainly negative in the context of the European polity. Since 
identification with Europe is weak and non-salient, the argument goes, few solidarity ties 
can arise between still nationally rooted European citizens (Delanty 2008). As a solution 
to this malaise, theorists such as Ross (2010) call for a reconceptualization of 
transnational solidarity that bypasses the essentialist, nationally bounded conceptions of 
solidarity. Habermas (1996) and Calhoun (2002) situate the possibility of European 
solidarity through engagement in a Europe-wide public sphere in which citizens become 
aware of the perspectives of all others.  
Yet, not all is lost when associating identification and solidarity in a transnational setting. 
The few empirical studies that make a connection between solidarity at the transnational 
level and European identification do show a positive correlation between the two 
concepts. Mau (2005) demonstrates that individuals who also embrace a European form 
of identification, as opposed to those who identify exclusively with their national 
community are also more prone to support redistributive policies at the European level. 
Since European identification is a significant predictor for European solidarity understood 
as transnational redistributive arrangements, it is relevant to test if identification with 
Europe also drives financial solidarity in the context of economic crisis. The first 
hypothesis proposed is that  
H1. Individuals who display a stronger degree of identification with Europe are 
more likely to support financial solidarity arrangements at the EU level.  
Still, the connection between (European) identity and solidarity cannot be properly 
understood without taking into account the role of social interactions. Social interactions 
among individuals create feelings of identity which, in turn, spill-over into solidarity 
among group members (Stjerno 2005). As Recchi (2012) argues, involvement in space-
situated associative relations make possible the consciousness of we-ness, of a shared 
identity which then spills over in support for social solidarity.  
Related to this, a separate line of inquiry does not consider identity as an intermediary 
category between social interaction and solidarity. Through interaction with others, 
previously strangers, the individual becomes sensitive to their concrete ‘pain’ and ‘needs’ 
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and expands her repertoire of solidarity (Rorty 1989). In this situation, interaction among 
individuals has a direct positive effect on the formation of solidarity ties. Drawing on 
previous research that shows a positive association between social interactions, cross-
border mobility and European identification (Recchi and Favell 2009; Kuhn 2011), this 
chapter investigates the implications of intra-EU mobility for the endorsement of a 
transnational conception of social solidarity. It is expected that  
H2. Individuals with a larger array of cross-border practices and connections are 
more prone to support a European conception of social solidarity.  
More specifically, transnational friendships and cross-border mobility practices, such as 
travelling or residing in other EU countries, are factors that can enable the formation of 
the ‘we-ness’. This, in turn may spill-over into a conception of solidarity at the 
transnational level. The analysis tests if these practices have a direct impact on solidarity 
or if they actually contribute to the embracement of a supranational identity which in 
turn has a positive effect on solidarity at the level of the EU. Two derived hypotheses are 
the following: 
H2a. A larger community of European friends increases individual support 
for transnational forms of solidarity. Since transnational friendships are 
relevant not only in terms of numbers, but also in terms of diversity of 
nationalities, it is expected that both large numbers and nationally diverse 
friendships to have a positive impact on transnational solidarity.  
H2b. A larger degree of cross-border practices is positively associated with 
the support for a supranational conception of solidarity. Following the 
analysis in Chapter 1 it is expected that more enduring patterns of cross-
border interactions such as transnationals, visitors and returnees to be 
positively related to the endorsement of transnational forms of solidarity.  
Operationalisation 
The following analysis is based on the survey samples with national respondents in the six 
countries selected. Question 3.15 of the EUCROSS survey is relevant for constructing the 
dependent variable:  
‘The EU member states are currently pooling national state funds to help EU 
countries having difficulties in paying their debts. On a scale from one to five, 
where one means “strongly disagree” and five means “strongly agree”: Please tell 
me how much you agree with this measure?’.  
Given that the variable is measured on a 1-5 scale, the analysis is based on a set of ordinal 
logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered per country of residence. In 
order to better understand the meaning of solidarity, the chapter also uses excerpts from 
the EUMEAN interviews. The answers have been coded with the Atlas.ti7 software and 
refer to the following question of the qualitative survey: 
“Do you think members states showed solidarity during the economic crisis?” 
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Regarding the independent variables, the survey offers a rich conceptualization of 
concepts such as European identity (H1), cross-border mobility and social interaction 
(H2). In relation to European identity, I test separately various measurements such as: 
a. On a scale from one to five, where one means “strongly disagree” and five 
means “strongly agree”, please tell me how much you agree with the following 
statements? “I feel European.” 
b. Do you consider yourself as being…CoR only/CoR and European/European and 
CoR/Only European/None of the above. 
c. If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been dissolved, would 
you be sorry about it, indifferent or relieved? , where those who responded 
“sorry” received a one and the rest zero.  
In the analysis I use the second measurement, as it is what gives a better fit of the model.  
The community of transnational friendships is measured both as numbers and diversity. I 
therefore test the significance of two variables. One refers to how many foreign born 
friends who live in another EU country the respondent has (none, some, a lot). The 
second one is related to the number of countries of residence of these friends (none, one, 
at least two). As the first measurement is not significant, the regression analyses shown 
below use the second measurement.  
Cross-border interactions are operationalized following the methodology described in 
Chapter 1. The analysis tests the role of the six patterns of cross-border mobilities in the 
support for a European form of social solidarity: transnationals, virtual transnationals, 
visitors, tourists, returnees and locals.  
The analysis controls for respondent’s level of education, age, gender, occupation 
(operationalized on a four point nominal scale such as managers, professionals, skilled 
workers and unskilled workers) and ideological positioning on the left-right scale. It is 
expected that higher levels of education and occupational status to be positively 
correlated with support for European solidarity. As well, a placement on the right on the 
ideological scale is connected to support for anti-immigration and anti-EU parties in 
several EU countries (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). Placement on the right has, in 
consequence, a negative impact on attitudes regarding solidarity at the EU level.  
 
European solidarity in the EUCROSS and EUMEAN surveys 
The distribution of respondents’ preferences regarding European solidarity is influenced 
by their national context. As table 1 shows, on the overall, roughly 50 per cent endorse 
institutional arrangements for financial risk sharing. However, Danish and German 
respondents tend to adopt a neutral (3) position while almost two thirds of Spaniards and 
Italians declare to agree and strongly agree. Romanians place themselves nearer 
Southern European opinions, while only a minority of British respondents agree with 
transnational financial redistribution. Although clear differences between countries can 
be observed, the relationship between the context of residence and preferences on 
transnational solidarity is weak (Cramer’s V<20). This suggests that besides nationality, 
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other factors play a more important role in explaining the diversity of opinions of 
EUCROSS respondents.  
Table 1 Percentages of answers on a 1-5 scale, where 1 is strong disagreement and 5 is total 
agreement with financial redistribution at the EU level 
 (1) 
strongly 
disagree 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
strongly 
agree 
(8)  
[Don't 
know] 
(9)  
[Answer 
refused] 
Total 
Germany 16.1 16.6 33.3 17 14.1 1.8 1.2 100 
Denmark 10.3 12.5 31.7 24.4 15.8 5.1 0.3 100 
UK 17.7 10.5 30.4 19.9 16.4 4.5 0.7 100 
Italy 5.7 3.9 18.3 18.6 50.9 2.2 0.4 100 
Romania 12.6 11.2 20.1 11.1 40.1 4.8 0.1 100 
Spain 4.5 3.1 15.1 23.4 49.7 3.5 0.7 100 
Total 11.1 9.6 24.8 19.1 31.1 3.7 0.6 100 
Pearson chi2(30) = 997.7703 Pr = 0.000 Cramer's V = 0.1821 
 
In what regards the meanings attached to European solidarity, the respondents have 
distinct understandings. The interviews from the qualitative EUMEAN survey are 
illustrative of the diversity of opinions. As an overall observation, German and Italian 
respondents tend to interpret solidarity as an individual act, while Spanish and Romanian 
interviewees speak more often about solidarity among nation-states. It is worth noting, 
though, that regardless of the meaning, the majority of respondents agree on the fact 
that neither citizens nor governments showed enough solidarity during the economic 
crisis.  
One understanding of solidarity endorsed by respondents refers to solidarity among 
individuals. An act of solidarity is perceived as the direct financial help to troubled 
individuals from other countries. But, in most of the cases the interviewees refuse to 
engage in such practices. 
“Well, I can only say that for me. I mean I am not really solidary, because if I was 
solidary, I would have to grab some Greek or something like that, who is retiring and 
has no money and I would have to transfer some money to his bank account, so that 
he would be able to make ends meet. That would be actual solidarity, as an 
individual. I don’t do that, you know. I’m not planning on it either. So in this sense 
I’m not solidary at that point, but I understand the people, that they complain.” 
(DE3, man, 46 years old) 
A second interpretation refers to solidarity among governments/states. For example, 
some interviewees propose to increase intra-EU labour mobility to help out fellow union-
members in need.  
“Perhaps there should be, for example, still more signals from the other countries, in 
which things are working out, such as Germany and Poland, which economically are 
faring well, to the outside that they are ready to accept workers. That is to accept 
them voluntarily.“ (DE7, woman, 34 years old)  
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Solidarity among EU governments also have negative connotation among the EUMEAN 
respondents. Most of the Spanish, Italian and migrant interviewees think that it has been 
only a façade, a political measure that does not refer to real solidarity but obscure hidden 
motives.  
“Come on!! Everybody turned their backs on everybody inside the European Union. 
They gave money; they’ve done certain things to help certain states, yes! I agree, 
but they didn’t help because they wanted those countries to survive or go through 
the crisis. They helped because they were afraid for themselves, their chairs, their 
countries. There is no cohesion strong enough inside the European Union that would 
create a strong European feeling.” (RO44, man, 42 years old) 
“Q: In general, would you say that the States and the people of the European 
countries have shown solidarity as expected in the face of this crisis? 
I think it is very easy to be in solidarity when things are good. But when things are 
complicated, it affects you, and you shut off into your own world, I think.” (ES6, 
woman, 40 years old) 
British and German respondents have more moderate opinions regarding the allegedly 
secret motives behind manifestations of financial solidarity among member states. These 
respondents are of the opinion that solidarity at the supranational level only became 
more manifest only after the national governments took the necessary measures. 
“Q: And how do you feel about that, for instance, Britain and countries helping the 
other countries who are perhaps in deeper crisis in Europe?  
A: That’s fine so long as that country is doing as much as it can do initially to help 
themselves. So long they are doing the max to help themselves, so long as they are 
not expecting us to give them, you know, millions of pounds and yet they’re letting 
their own people pay a very low rate of tax, or whatever it might be, I don’t know 
how it works. So long as they are helping themselves to the max then I don’t mind.” 
(UK9, woman, 56 years old) 
 
European solidarity, identity and cross-border practices 
This section discusses the relation between transnational solidarity, identification, and 
cross-border practices. As already anticipated in the theoretical section, ‘national 
identities’ are the cement of social solidarity in the context of modern nation states. Can 
identification with Europe play a similar role, in spite of its weak and non-salient 
character? The significance tests indicate that there is a very weak but significant 
correlation between attitudes towards European solidarity and identification with Europe 
(table 2). Individuals who claim to have some sort of European identity are more likely to 
agree with common policies of financial risk sharing. The respondents who feel strongly 
European are the group with the lowest proportion among those against transnational 
financial redistribution policies, albeit they are also the most numerous among the 
‘neutrals’.  
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Table 2 Preferences of European solidarity and identification with Europe (results in 
percentages) 
Solidarity Only national National and 
European 
European and 
National 
Strongly 
European 
1 18.97 8.64 6.88 7.45 
2 12.28 9.22 9.40 5.88 
3 26.49 25.33 24.50 32.16 
4 16.26 22.03 22.15 14.51 
5 26.00 34.78 37.08 40.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Pearson chi2(12)=2044615 Pr=0.000    Cramér's V=   0.1089 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show a similar perspective in what concerns transnational friendships. The 
larger the number of foreign friends, the greater the probability of supporting European 
solidarity. The difference between the various groups of transnational friendships is even 
more visible when we take into account the range of European nationalities that 
constitute them. Thus, the larger the number of countries these friends live in, the 
greater the support for transnational solidarity. This finding corroborates previous 
arguments related to the role of ‘human interaction’ as a basis of social solidarity.  
Table 3 Preferences of European solidarity and number of friends in other EU countries (results 
in percentages) 
Solidarity A lot Some None 
1 13.00 8.74 12.03 
2 7.33 6.88 10.61 
3 21.33 27.33 24.97 
4 21.67 23.09 18.63 
5 36.67 33.96 33.76 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Pearson chi2(8) =  32.7763   Pr = 0.000 Cramér's V =   0.0689      
 
Table 4 Preferences of European solidarity and range of friendships in other EU countries 
(results in percentages) 
Solidarity No foreign 
country 
One country Several 
countries 
Total 
1 12.09 10.14 8.13 11.65 
2 10.65 7.57 6.02 10.05 
3 25.77 27.38 25.30 25.91 
4 19.82 21.26 18.37 19.90 
5 31.67 33.66 42.17 32.49 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Pearson chi2(8)=288.354 Pr=0.000  Cramér's V=0.0501      
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The relation between European solidarity and patterns of cross-border practices displays 
a complex outlook (table 5). The fine-grained LCA analysis shows that the cleavage in 
terms of attitudes towards European solidarity is not between locals and transnationals. 
Still the results make sense: the least likely from showing solidarity with other Europeans 
are the tourists, even more so than locals. Tourists are characterized by non-committed, 
consumption-oriented mobility experiences. This observation confirms previous 
theoretical arguments according to which visiting foreign places and enjoyment of travel 
do not necessarily lead to the formation of self-aware cosmopolitans (Calhoun 2002). In a 
similar vein, this analysis shows that cross-border interactions in the form of tourism does 
not bring about a moral responsibility towards the other Europeans. As in the case of 
those who feel strongly European, transnationals are the group with the lowest 
proportion among those who clearly oppose transnational solidarity. Nonetheless, they 
are also quite numerous among the neutrals.  
 
Table 5 Preferences of European solidarity and transnational behaviour (results in percentages) 
Solidarity Trans-
nationals 
Virtual 
transnati
onals 
Visitors Tourists Returnees Locals Total 
1 8.09 10.63 10.72 11.93 11.37 12.46 11.51 
2 8.38 9.33 9.60 12.79 7.80 9.65 10.10 
3 26.88 21.69 29.12 27.67 26.09 24.31 26.01 
4 24.57 18.22 21.92 22.75 17.17 17.46 19.88 
5 32.08 40.13 28.64 24.85 37.57 36.11 32.48 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Pearson chi2(20)=1050689   Pr=0.000    Cramér's V=0.0689        
  
 
A statistical assessment of European solidarity 
The previous analysis shows that European identity and diverse transnational friendships 
are positively associated with transnational solidarity, while the role of cross-border 
mobility is not straightforward. However, these associations may be actually determined 
by respondent’s national context and individual characteristics such as ideology, level of 
education, occupation, income, age and gender. Moreover, as it has already been argued 
in the theoretical section, transnational friendships and patterns of cross-border mobility 
may be indirectly correlated to social solidarity. They are significant for the formation of 
European identification, which, in turn, positively influences the endorsement of 
transnational forms of solidarity. Table 6 presents the regression results of two models 
seeking to solve these questions. More specifically, Model 1 tests the significance of 
European identity, patterns of cross-border mobility and range of transnational 
friendships by controlling for individuals’ ideology, socio-economic status and country of 
residence. Models 2 examines the significance of cross-border mobility patterns and 
range of transnational friendships without controlling for identification.  
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Table 6 European solidarity: ordered logistic regressions with robust standard errors  
                                               Model 1 Model 2  
                                               Coef/se Coef/se  
European identity (base Only national) 
  National and European 0.41*** 0.11 
  National and European 0.53*** 0.14 
  Strongly EUR 0.34 0.30 
    
Number of European friends CoR (Base none) 
  One country -0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 
Several countries 0.22* 0.09 0.25** 0.09 
  
                                               Model 1 Model 2  
Patterns of cross-border mobility (base Locals) 
 Virtual transnationals -0.08 0.10 -0.07 0.09 
Tourists -0.09 0.05 -0.07 0.04 
Transnationals -0.03 0.07 0.04 0.08 
Visitors -0.12 0.07 -0.07 0.07 
Returnees 0.07+ 0.03 0.09* 0.03 
    
Ideology and SES    
Ideology (base left) 
   Centre -0.27* 0.12 -0.27* 0.13 
Right 
-
0.42*** 0.12 -0.44** 0.14 
No ideology -0.21 0.21 -0.25 0.22 
Education (base Less than high-school) 
  Secondary education 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.08 
Tertiary education 0.19* 0.08 0.21* 0.09 
Occupation (base workers) 
   Managers 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.13 
Professionals 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.10 
Technicians and associate 
professionals -0.09 0.06 -0.09 0.06 
Socioeconomic status (base Very 
difficult situation) 
    Difficult financial situation 0.24** 0.08 0.26*** 0.07 
Make ends meet -0.09 0.16 -0.06 0.16 
Comfortable financial situation 0.16 0.09 0.21* 0.08 
Very comfortable financial situation 0.16 0.11 0.21 0.11 
Age -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Female 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.09 
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                                               Model 1 Model 2  
                                               Coef/se Coef/se  
Country of residence (base Germany) 
  Denmark 0.43*** 0.05 0.35*** 0.03 
UK 0.35*** 0.06 0.20*** 0.02 
Italy 1.69*** 0.16 1.70*** 0.17 
Romania 1.01*** 0.15 0.97*** 0.16 
Spain 1.73*** 0.14 1.73*** 0.14 
R-squared 
    N. of cases 5434 
 
5434 
 +p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
   
 
Identification with the EU is a significant predictor for the support of a European 
conception of solidarity, confirming hypothesis one (Model 1). Thus, in relation to 
national citizens those who claim to identify with Europe (in combination with national 
identification) are more likely to endorse a transnational conception of solidarity. After 
computing predicted probabilities the results look as follows: the probability of scoring 1 
on the 1-5 solidarity scale decreases from 0.12 to 0.108 when European identification 
changes from only national to European and national and all other variables are kept at 
their means. The probability of scoring 5 on the 1-5 solidarity scale increases from 0.24 to 
0.31 when identification with Europe changes from 1 to 3 and all other variables are kept 
at their means.  
Regarding H2a, social contacts in other EU countries affect positively support for 
European solidarity. As models 1-2 show, having friends in at least two European 
countries is a relevant predictor even after controlling for respondent’s degree of 
identification with the EU. Given that the coefficients of the variables decrease from 
Model 3 to Model 2, the effect of transnational friendships on solidarity is both direct and 
indirect, mediated by respondent’s level of identification. However, as Model 1 indicates, 
only a diverse community of foreign friends, spread in at least two countries, has a direct 
effect on the support for a European conception of solidarity.  
The various patterns of cross-border practices do not have a direct effect on solidarity, 
except for returnees. As previously discussed in this report, cross-border mobility inside 
the EU has a positive role in fostering identification with Europe, but it does not affect 
directly respondent’s support for transnational solidarity. In other words, physical 
mobility inside the EU does have a role for the support of transnational forms of 
solidarity, provided that it has a positive effect on the formation of a European identity. In 
this sense, H2b is confirmed only in the limited case of returnees.  
Respondent’s ideology plays a significant role in the formation of attitudes towards 
European solidarity independently of European identification. Placement on the right of 
the ideological scale is associated with a negative conception on European solidarity. This 
may be explained by the fact that far-right parties tend to have an anti-European 
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discourse, especially in terms of redistribution at the European level or toward foreign-
born residents and therefore offer negative cues to their voters.  
More educated Europeans also tend to be more solidary, even when controlling for the 
effect of identification, while occupation does not seem to make a difference. Income is 
significant only when comparing respondents with a difficult financial situation with those 
with a very difficult financial position. Gender and age do not stratify the preferences in 
terms of European solidarity.  
The results also show that in comparison to German respondents, all the others tend to 
support European solidarity to a larger extent. Nonetheless, there are clear differences 
between Nordic and Mediterranean respondents. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Transnational solidarity is a concept of reference in European treaties and policy 
documents. Yet, the understanding of present-day solidarities is still anchored in 
nationally-bounded societies both in the public and academic discourse (Borgmann-Prebil 
and Ross 2010). It is for this reason that social sciences are equipped with few theoretical 
and empirical lenses in order to understand the phenomenon beyond the borders of the 
national states. Normative and legal scholars made important advances in meaningfully 
theorizing solidarity in the modern EU context (Ross and Borgmann-Prebil 2010; Calhoun 
2002; Habermas 1996; Delanty 2010). Complementary to these works, this paper offers a 
first cut into explaining individual support for financial solidarity in the context of the EU.  
The previous findings show that in spite of being a weak and non-salient type of identity 
(Diez-Medrano 2010), identification with Europe matters for fostering attitudes of 
solidarity among European citizens. However, it is not only the abstract forms of 
identification what make people endorse a European form of solidarity, but also 
emotional attachment constructed through social interactions. The argument is 
supported by the significance of transnational friendships. The more diverse is the 
spectrum of European friends, that is, the larger the number of countries they come 
from, the greater the propensity to support transnational forms of solidarity. These 
findings point to classical sociological and philosophical ideas about solidarity. As Weber 
(1922/1978) has already argued decades ago, it is through social interactions and 
emotional ties at the micro-level that people become to embrace attitudes of solidarity. 
Or, in more recent postmodern language, Rorty (1989) argues that is the ‘sensitivity’ to 
others what makes people’s sense of solidarity grow.  
Among the various forms of cross-border mobilities, returnees seem to develop a moral 
outlook in what regards the European communities. This finding suggests that it is not 
necessarily the frequency or intensity of physical border-crossing to determine a 
conception of transnational solidarity, but an enduring, long-term and emotional 
immersion in another society. In this regards the formation of responsibility bonds among 
Europeans is a slow and long-term process which does not immediately follow to the 
removal of border controls.  
 
125 
 
 
References 
Blekesaune, M., & Quadagno, J. (2003). Public attitudes toward welfare state policies a 
comparative analysis of 24 nations. European Sociological Review,19(5), 415-427. 
Borgmann-Prebil Y. and Ross M. (2010). Promoting European solidarity. Between rhetoric 
and reality. In Ross M. and Borgmann-Prebil Y. (eds). Promoting solidarity in the 
European Union.  
Calhoun, C. J. (2002). Imagining solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, constitutional patriotism, 
and the public sphere. Public culture, 14(1), 147-171. 
De Deken et al. (2006). Social Solidarity. In Clark, G. L., Munnell, A. H., & Orszag, J. M. 
(Eds.). The Oxford handbook of pensions and retirement income (Vol. 13).  
Delanty, G. (2008). Fear of others: social exclusion and the European crisis of 
solidarity. Social policy & administration, 42(6), 676-690. 
Durkheim, E. (1893/1997). The division of labor in society. Simon and Schuster. 
Eger, M. A. (2010). Even in Sweden: the effect of immigration on support for welfare state 
spending. European Sociological Review, 26(2), 203-217. 
Fligstein, N. (2008). Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe: The 
EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe. Oxford University Press. 
Gelissen, J. (2000). Popular support for institutionalised solidarity: a comparison between 
European welfare states. International Journal of Social Welfare, 9(4), 285-300. 
Habermas J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of 
Law and Democracy, Cambridge: MIT Press 
Hechter, M. (1988). Principles of group solidarity (Vol. 11). Univ of California Press. 
Jæger, M. M. (2006). Welfare regimes and attitudes towards redistribution: The regime 
hypothesis revisited. European Sociological Review, 22(2), 157-170. 
Kuhn, T. (2011). Individual transnationalism, globalisation and euroscepticism: An 
empirical test of Deutsch's transactionalist theory. European Journal of Political 
Research, 50(6), 811-837. 
Mayhew, L. (1971). Systems of solidarity. Society: Institutions and activity, 67-92. 
Mau, S. (2005). Democratic demand for a social Europe? Preferences of the European 
citizenry. International Journal of Social Welfare, 14(2), 76-85. 
Medrano, J. D. (2003). Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom. Princeton University Press. 
Van Oorschot, W. (2002). Individual motives for contributing to welfare benefits in the 
Netherlands. Policy & Politics, 30(1), 31-46. 
van Oorschot, W., & Komter, A. (1998). What is it that ties...? Theoretical perspectives on 
social bond. Sociale Wetenschappen, 41(3), 5-24. 
Recchi, E., Transnational Practices and European Identity: From Theoretical to Policy 
Issues, EUCROSS Working Paper no. 3, Università di Chieti-Pescara, Chieti, 2012. 
Recchi, E., & Favell, A. (Eds.). (2009). Pioneers of European integration: citizenship and 
mobility in the EU. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge University Press. 
126 
 
Ross, M. G., & Borgmann-Prebil, Y. (Eds.). (2010). Promoting solidarity in the European 
Union. Oxford University Press. 
Stegmueller, D., Scheepers, P., Roßteutscher, S., & de Jong, E. (2012). Support for 
Redistribution in Western Europe: Assessing the role of religion.European sociological 
review, 28(4), 482-497. 
Stjernø, S. (2009). Solidarity in Europe: The history of an idea. Cambridge University Press. 
Weber, M. (1922/1978). Economy and Society. University of California Press. 
